http://www.chem.vt.edu/ethics/vinny/ethix_1.html
MISCONDUCT IN SCIENCE:
DO SCIENTISTS NEED A PROFESSIONAL CODE OF ETHICS?
by: Vincent N. Hamner
Final paper submitted to: Dr. H.H. Bauer. STS 5424 -- May 1992.
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INTRODUCTION
Discussions of misconduct in science have become prevalent in the
literature. Fundamental texts regarding this subject have been published in
recent years.(1,2) Many of these case studies are primarily of historical
interest. Within the past few decades however, many more instances have
come under scrutiny. The ease by which information is exchanged today has
allowed for the general public to become increasingly aware of supposedly
"isolated instances" of misconduct in science.
A literature search using the key words "SCIENCE & FRAUD" on an INFOTRAC
CD-ROM-based data system yielded over two-hundred and thirty citations
regarding these topics during the years from 1988 to 1991. Typical
citations in the popular literature were available for news-magazines and
newspapers such as Time, Newsweek, The New York Times, The Chronicle of
Higher Education, and U.S. News & World Report. Commonly cited science
related publications included Science, Nature, New Scientist, Science News,
Omni, Discover, and The Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA).
Business related publications such as Forbes, Fortune Magazine, The
Economist, and Business Week were cited as well. It would seem that
discussions of "SCIENCE & FRAUD" in contemporary periodicals have become
quite fashionable.
The goal of this paper is to examine the following question: "Do scientists
need a professional code of ethics?". First, it will be necessary to define
the types of scientific misconduct and provide modern examples of these
instances. We will examine a set of "golden rules of science": the
scientific method. What are the generally accepted norms of science? Many
professional scientific societies have already adopted professional codes
of ethics within the past few decades. A number of others are in the
process of refining and updating their codes. The American Association for
the Advancement of Science (AAAS) has surveyed 241 professional societies
in order to determine how many of their member societies have adopted
ethical codes. A discussion of their findings and suggestions will be in
order.
I. The Types of Scientific Misconduct
II. What are the Rules of the Game?
III. Which is worse for Science: Negligence or Deliberate Misconduct?
IV. Do Scientists Need a Professional Code of Ethics?
Literature Cited
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I. THE TYPES OF SCIENTIFIC MISCONDUCT
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Negligence
There are two broad categories of scientific misconduct that must initially
be taken into consideration. The first category is perhaps best classified
as scientific negligence. For this classification, we will include those
instances where scientists have provided erroneous information, but have
not set out from the beginning with the intent to defraud. For these cases,
not only is the public "fooled", but the scientist is also deceived. The
scientist who experiences this self-deception is one who has no
premeditated plans to be dishonest. The researcher is exposed as having
human faults, a trait that may be considered by many to be inappropriate
for the scientist to exhibit.
The false information promulgated by such erroneous research may not ever
be discovered. This would depend on a number of factors; the primary of
these being the relative importance of the work in that specific field of
research. As a case in point, consider the cold fusion fiasco of recent
years.(3) Is it reasonable to assume that such a fuss would have been made
over erroneous results reported with regard to relatively "uninteresting"
bits of research? It is most unlikely.
It is noteworthy that contemporary cases of proven negligence are not well
documented in the pertinent literature. An exception to this observation is
the aforementioned cold fusion problem. The details associated with the
attempt by scientists to achieve cold fusion have been described
elsewhere.(3) The controversy itself stems from the claimed success of
achieving fusion at room temperatures by two scientists, B. Stanley Pons
(University of Utah) and Martin Fleischmann (University of Southampton in
England). Initially many of their contemporaries believed that Pons and
Fleischmann achieved their results through experimental error and poor
procedures; however, a panel of outside scientists has deemed that the
research performed at the Utah National Cold Fusion Institute is
scientifically sound.(4) So why all the fuss?
Pons and Fleischmann did not follow the commonly accepted procedures for
announcing their experimental findings. It is standard practice for
scientists to submit their experimental methodologies and collected data to
a scholarly journal for review and eventual publication. Evidently, Pons
and Fleischmann did submit a paper to the journal Nature; however, it was
rejected on the grounds that it contained insufficient detail regarding
their experiments. Thus, in their haste to go public with the claim, their
research methods and results were not reviewed by a panel of their peers
prior to being released to the public via the media and popular press. They
didn't even have the opportunity to perform basic control experiments of
their own.
Why did they release information about their work prematurely? The
opportunity to claim priority for the discovery of cold fusion was
undoubtedly an important reason. In another frequently publicized
accusation of misconduct (perhaps originally stemming from an act of
negligence), it has been suggested that Robert Gallo may not actually have
priority in his claim to have co-discovered the cause of the AIDS virus.(5)
Initially, one might wonder "Why make such a fuss? Why does it really
matter who was first in discovering the cause of AIDS?". Two primary
motivating factors have been illuminated: gain of notoriety (which includes
the soon-to-follow prestige and bolstering of reputation) and financial
gain. Gallo's group was able to patent their sensitive method of detecting
the AIDS virus. Therein lies a portion of the financial motivation.
Granted, many scientists are personally motivated by the self-satisfaction
and excitement associated with doing novel research. Many practicing
scientists are extremely dedicated to their work; however, being a
scientist is also a job. Scientists must foster the growth of their careers
no differently than persons in other vocations. They must prove that they
are proficient in the performance of the tasks that they set out to
accomplish. A claim of priority in a new discovery is strong supporting
evidence. Returning to the cold fusion example, it has been suggested that
administrators at the University of Utah encouraged Pons and Fleischmann to
release information about their experimentation prematurely. The university
would have shared not only in the prestige associated with the claim, but
they stood to gain significant financial allocations from the state and
federal governments as well.
Would things have turned out differently if Pons and Fleischmann had waited
for the completion of the peer review process? This is an impossible
question to answer. It may only be surmised that their peers would have
recognized the paper describing the cold fusion process to be flawed.
However, this might not have been the case. It has been noted that "...in
physics, textbook science may be about 90% right whereas the primary
literature [published research] is probably 90% wrong.".(6) There are many
documented cases illustrating the ease with which unsound research papers
have succeeded in achieving publication.(1) An additional difficulty
associated with the cold fusion case rests with reproducibility of Pons and
Fleischmann's experimental work. Soon after they released the details
concerning their physical apparatus and experimental methods, other
laboratories attempted to reproduce this room temperature fusion. Some
laboratories claimed success and others reported failure. The jury is still
out regarding the likelihood of room temperature fusion. Even as recently
as March 27, 1992 (the third anniversary of the announcement of cold
fusion), advocates for cold fusion research "...bitterly attacked the
scientific establishment for its rejection and disregard of the
controversial phenomenon.".(7) The same article reports that Pons recently
told Italian journalists that he expected a cold fusion demonstration
device to be unveiled before the end of the year. As for the possibility of
cold fusion, only time will tell. If it actually works, Pons and
Fleischmann will assuredly not be remembered solely for their negligence.
Deliberate Dishonesty
The second category of scientific misconduct involves the deliberate
attempt by a scientist to be dishonest. Included are premeditated acts of
fraud that may include forged or fabricated data, falsified or invented
results, plagiarism, piracy, hoaxes, and other such malicious acts.
Two recent texts concerned with instances of scientific misconduct have
been quite explicit in defining the types of premeditated cheating that may
occur.(1,2) Broad & Wade attribute the descriptions of "trimming",
"cooking", and forging to Charles Babbage's 1830 text Reflections on the
Decline of Science in England. It would seem that there were concerns about
premeditated scientific misconduct well over one-hundred and fifty years
ago. Trimming, according to Babbage, would essentially be the act of
forcing observations to fit a desired mean by removing portions of those
data points that deviate in excess and adding these portions to those data
points that deviate in the other extreme. Babbage defined cooking as the
process of making many measurements and then only reporting those choice
measurements that are deemed satisfactory by the appropriate standards.
Finally, he describes forgery as the act of recording fictitious results by
one who wishes to build a scientific reputation.
Kohn attempts to translate these terms into contemporary jargon in Chapter
1 of his text.(2) Cooking, he writes, would now be recognized as finagling
and trimming will be recognized as massaging the data or fudging. He also
notes that plagiarism may simply be considered as another type of forgery.
A thorough discussion of the documented cases of scientific dishonesty will
not be found here. Interested readers are encouraged to consult the
following texts: Betrayers of the Truth, by Broad and Wade, and False
Prophets, by Kohn.(1,2) Both texts cite not only contemporary instances of
misconduct, but many historical cases as well. Bauer has written that "It
is difficult enough to prove a living person guilty of deliberate deceit,
even greater caution is appropriate in finding guilty those who came
before.".(6) Heeding this warning, we will consider as an example of
scientific fraud the eminent and contemporary instance commonly referred to
as the Baltimore case.
In 1986, a researcher in the field of immunology, Margot O'Toole, raised
questions about a paper submitted to the journal Cell by Thereza
Imanishi-Kiri. At that time, O'Toole was a postdoctoral student in
Imanishi-Kiri's laboratory and she lost her job as a result of this
whistle-blowing.(8) David Baltimore, former president of Rockefeller
University, shared responsibility for the paper as one of five authors.
Baltimore discussed the disputed data with Imanishi-Kiri in 1986; however,
the records weren't scrutinized due to reported disorganization of the
notebooks and supporting documents. Baltimore staunchly defended the work
of his co-author; a retraction of the paper in question was not initiated.
O'Toole was not satisfied. She brought her concerns to immunologists at
Tufts University and in June of 1986 they concluded that there was no
evidence of foul play. This conclusion was supported by a following review
at MIT. O'Toole persisted. In January 1989, an NIH panel investigated the
matter. Although some questions were raised regarding the acquisition of
the scrutinized data, the panel concluded that the paper was essentially
sound. Baltimore continued to support the work of his colleague and placed
100% trust in the integrity of the Cell paper.
In May of 1989, Baltimore, Imanishi-Kiri, O'Toole, and others participated
in official hearings before a U.S. Congress investigations subcommittee.
The Secret Service offered potential evidence of foul play obtained from
forensic analyses of ribbon ink, printer, and paper upon which the data in
question were produced. Baltimore dismissed this evidence and continued to
adamantly defend his colleague. He provided a stirring commentary regarding
these hearings for the periodical Technology Review. Titled
"Self-Regulation of Science", Baltimore offered the view that "The worth of
a piece of research is determined when scientific peers attempt to
reproduce or, more commonly, extend an experimenter's results.".(9) He
argued that there were those who
"want to substitute criteria and methods more appropriate for
ferreting out corporate fraud than for evaluating a scientific
investigation. They wish to impose rules that would not merely
regulate science but regiment it. This poses a danger to the
integrity of the scientific process.".(9)
It is ironic that Baltimore would agree in his short essay that "We must be
alert to indications of fraud and misconduct, and ready to discipline the
perpetrators.". In March of 1991, NIH investigators concluded that
Imanishi-Kiri forged entire sets of data during the years from 1986 to 1988
in order to support her Cell paper. The investigation didn't resolve the
question of whether simple error, mistakes, or fraud led to the original
discrepancies in the paper. Once it came under scrutiny however,
Imanishi-Kiri began to systematically fabricate data to support it.(10) In
March of 1991, Baltimore finally requested that Cell retract the paper in
question. In May, he issued a statement to NIH that included an apology to
Margot O'Toole.(11) He cited that his defense of his colleague was fueled
"by my respect for Dr. Imanishi-Kiri's demonstrated abilities as a
scientist, by my belief that the paper's scientific conclusions were sound,
and by my trust in the efficacy of the peer review process.". It is tragic
that Baltimore would argue so adamantly for the self-regulation of science
and yet not make a positive contribution to the process himself.
Those who read Baltimore's literary accounts will find that he is a very
careful writer. Many of his statements express keen insight into the
workings of science as an institution. At the same time, his handling of
the affair as portrayed by the media is a terribly embarrassing example of
'how not to handle an allegation of scientific misconduct'. Dr. Baltimore
wanted to be such a strong spokesperson for his colleagues (and seemingly
defend the honor of science as well), that he neglected to mind the affairs
at hand. He made extraordinary statements before NIH investigators; such as
"You can make up anything that you want in your notebooks, but you can't
call it fraud unless it's published."!(10) He responded with hostility
toward the initiators of the congressional investigative committees in
which he was invited to participate. Baltimore's credibility was soon
damaged if not completely destroyed. He has since resigned from his
position as president of Rockefeller University. Even Nobel laureates share
human character flaws and motives -- both his personal and scientific
reputations have undoubtedly suffered dearly following this spectacle. A
full literary account of this affair will undoubtedly provide for
interesting reading.
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* Return to Misconduct in Science
* Next Chapter
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II. WHAT ARE THE RULES OF THE GAME?
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It has been reported that Harriet Zuckerman suggests that we should
"distinguish between fraud as a deviation from the moral norms of science
and negligence as a deviation from the methodological norms. She sees two
sorts of cognitive errors in science: reputable ones and disreputable
ones".(12) Thus, one may consider these deviations as two separate
instances where 1). the scientist doesn't follow the methodological rules
of the game or 2). the scientist doesn't feel the moral rules of the game.
The Conventionally Accepted Methodological Norm:
The Scientific Method
We now have the opportunity to consider the commonly accepted
methodological and moral norms of science. The methodological norms in
their simplest form are generally recognized as the Scientific Method.
Often the scientific method is listed as a discrete series of steps that
all scientists should follow in order to do "proper science". A
conventional definition of the method is the "systematic, controlled
observation or experiment, whose results lead to hypotheses; which are
found valid, or found invalid, through further work; leading eventually to
reliable theories [or a renewal of the cycle beginning with a
reconsideration of the original hypothesis]".(6) The scientific method says
to the impressionable reader "Follow me and you simply cannot go wrong in
the performance of your laboratory experiments.". It has been argued
elsewhere, and for good reason, that the scientific method is a myth.(1,6)
Hopefully, the reader will agree that the scientific method must be treated
as an ideal set of recommendations which scientists should strive to
follow; that there are no guarantees that the scientific method will be
applicable to every instance of scientific research. It is an ideal that
each individual scientist must choose to incorporate into their work. There
are many examples that clearly illustrate this argument.(6)
In many general science texts, the scientific method is stated quite
explicitly. Students in American public schools, who may never have the
opportunity to participate in a research environment, are frequently taught
that science works only by following these methodological norms. This is
surely harmful to the public image of science. Science isn't such a
well-defined undertaking as the method indicates. It is refreshing to
discover a text that exposes the myth of the method. Brown and LeMay have
written
"There is no fail-proof, step-by-step scientific method that
scientists use. The approaches of various scientists depend on
their temperament, circumstances, and training. Rarely will two
scientists approach the problem in the same way. The scientific
approach involves doing one's utmost with one's mind to
understand the workings of nature. Just because we can spell out
the results of science so concisely or neatly in textbooks does
not mean that scientific progress is smooth, certain, and
predictable.".(13)
Although not expressly stated in their text, Brown and LeMay have indicated
that there are two types of science: textbook and frontier. Bauer argues
that "The scientific method doesn't allow for us to distinguish between
reliable textbook science and unreliable frontier science.".(6) He has
stated that "Textbook science is uncontroversial" and that "We all learn
science from textbooks, and we can hardly fail to be impressed by the range
and reliability of the knowledge that has been amassed...".(6) Textbook
science and frontier science are differentiated from one another in that
"... we rarely remain excited by this [textbook science], at least not for
long. What we do get excited about is the very latest stuff [frontier
science]... what gets into the newspapers and magazines and onto
television.".(6) Bauer offers the following illuminating summary: "The
trouble is that we use the same word "science" to describe both the
reliable textbook stuff and the exciting frontier stuff.".(6)
Continuing with the work of Brown and LeMay, we find that they also mention
that
"The path of any scientific study is likely to be irregular and
uncertain; progress is often slow and many promising leads turn
out to be dead ends. ... we will see that serendipity has played
an important role in the development of science. What we will
often miss discussing are the doubts, conflicts, clashes of
personalities, and revolutions of perception that have led to our
present ideas.".(13)
Such authors are to be commended for painting such an accurate portrait.
Both the student and the general public receive a grave disservice when the
methodological norms of science are explained only in terms of the
scientific method.
The Conventionally Accepted Moral Norms:
Merton's Contribution
R.K. Merton first suggested in 1942 that the behavior of scientists could
be exemplified by a coherent set of norms. Ziman reminds us that "The
Mertonian norms are not, of course, a precisely defined and standardized
code...".(14) Schmaus advises that "These norms are shared only among
members of the scientific community and not by society at large.".(12)
These norms include: universalism, communalism, disinterestedness, and
organized skepticism. R.H. Brown offers the following insightful
interpretations:
"Universalism requires that science be independent of race,
color, or creed and that it should be essentially international.
Communalism requires that scientific knowledge should be public
knowledge; that the results of research should be published; that
there should be freedom of exchange of scientific information
between scientists everywhere, and that scientist should be
responsible to the scientific community for the trustworthiness
of their published work. Disinterestedness requires that the
results of bona fide scientific research should not be
manipulated to serve considerations such as personal profit,
ideology, or expediency, in other words they should be honest and
objective; it does not mean that research should not be
competitive. Organized skepticism requires that statements should
not be accepted on the word of authority, but that scientists
should be free to question them and that the truth of any
statement should finally rest on a comparison with observed
fact.".(15)
Ziman has suggested that originality should be considered as a primary norm
as well.(14) Even though originality is an essential characteristic of
science it was not included by Merton in his initial listing. Originality
requires that scientific research be novel. Ziman explains that "An
investigation that adds nothing new to what is already well known and
understood makes no contribution to science.".(14) He also notes that
organized skepticism is a misnomer -- "although skepticism is strongly
encouraged within the scientific community, it is not organized very
systematically...".(14) Incidentally, the handy acronym CUDOS is offered by
Ziman as a convenient reminder of these five norms.
For each of the proposed norms, it is possible to illustrate existing flaws
and weaknesses. The requirement of universalism, that science is
international, seems to hold well. However, Ziman notes that "The tragic
experience of Soviet genetics under Lysenko is direct evidence of what can
happen when the norm of universalism is not respected".(14) He also
suggests that there is a "...tendency for groups of specialists to
discriminate against the opinions of outsiders and lay-persons.". The norm
of disinterestedness is particularly flawed. As long as scientists are
human, science cannot truly proceed in a disinterested and objective
manner. Schmaus has concluded that
"The growth of scientific knowledge does not depend on a norm of
disinterestedness peculiar to the scientific profession. And it
may be unjust or unfair to require that scientists be
disinterested -- unlike the rest of us.".(12)
It has been suggested that it is possible to distinguish between special
moral norms (for instance, the Mertonian Norms) and general moral norms
(for example, honesty).(12) Schmaus argues that "Scientists who commit
fraud thus violate not a moral rule that applies only to them and enjoins
them from self-interested activity, but a moral rule that applies to
everybody and requires scientists to do their duty.".(12) Bauer claims that
"The system works better, the more each member of it strives to behave
according to the ideals expressed in the myth of the scientific method and
the Mertonian norms." and that "Scientists like all other professional
people should strive to the utmost to behave ethically, for without that
science will not work properly.".(6) In general, it seems that there is
agreement regarding the validity and importance of both special moral norms
and general moral norms. However, the manner in which violators of the
norms are disciplined is not generally agreed upon.
How are offenders to be punished?
If it does become exposed, how is scientific negligence conventionally
dealt with? If the erroneous work is discovered by the initiator after it
has entered the public domain, then either corrections to the work or, in
more severe cases, retractions of the work are typically announced. For
literary accounts of the research, this is undoubtedly an embarrassing, but
relatively painless mechanism of righting the wrong. If the erroneous work
is discovered by the perpetrator's colleagues, then either corrections or
retractions are made in a similar fashion. There may be those who would
think badly of the negligent scientist, but there are undoubtedly many more
who will be saying "I'm glad that was the other fellow, and not me.".
This occurrence is a commonly accepted practice among scientists.
Typically, such mistakes will not cause much of a fuss; however, numerous
"errors" originating from a single scientist's laboratory will undoubtedly
cultivate suspicions. Baltimore has noted that "Authors of scientific
papers risk everything when they publish their work. If a researcher
develops a reputation for error, other scientists scrutinize his or her
work all the more closely. And because funding decisions are made on the
basis of peer review, error-prone scientists soon lose their financial
support and are no longer able to function. This process is the ultimate
safeguard against errors, whether they are consciously perpetrated or
not.".(9) Thus, for minor infractions, disciplinary actions resulting from
negligence may consist of mere formalities, customarily exercised
internally. The general public and press need not interfere. However, at
the opposite end of the spectrum, there are those who believe that
"negligence should [also] be regarded as grounds for debarment.".(12)
Debarment of a negligent scientific researcher would initially seem to be
an exercise of punishment to the extreme. Obviously, not every instance of
negligence should be dealt with in this manner. As an analogy, the American
practice of law offers two separate distinctions for instances of homicide:
voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. It is conventionally agreed that
persons guilty of voluntary manslaughter will receive harsher penalties
than those responsible for involuntary manslaughter. Realistically, this is
an oversimplified analogy. There will be many "degrees" of wrongdoing
associated with each type of misconduct. It is always required that a jury
of impartial persons decide the nature and degree of punishment for each
individual case. The accused persons are innocent until proven guilty. They
are aware of their specific rights from the very moment that accusations
are made. This system of justice cannot be perfect, but it is a
standardized system. We believe that it is the best possible system of
justice that can presently be utilized. Would it not be best to handle
instances of scientific misconduct in a similar fashion? Bauer has
mentioned that "Fraud in science should be dealt with just as it is dealt
with in business, government or anywhere else: unhysterically, under the
rules we have evolved that safeguard the accused until such time as guilt
may have been proven beyond reasonable doubt.".(6)
Disciplinary actions against fraudulent researchers do tend to be more
serious than for instances of negligence. The punishment normally fits the
crime -- just as it should. Resignation and debarment are common.(1,2)
After reformed bank robbers have paid their debt to society, they are not
offered employment as security guards. Likewise, deceitful scientists are
no longer allowed to participate in science. The institution of science
demands mutual trust and cooperation among its players. Schmaus has argued
that "...negligent work gives rise to occasions in which scientists are
tempted to commit fraud.".(12) He suggests that "The attempt to control
fraud indirectly through discouragement of negligence may prove more
fruitful than the search for a way to prevent scientists from acting
selfishly in response to career pressures.". This analyis is seemingly
flawed; it would be unrealistic and extremely difficult to place serious
sanctions on those researchers guilty only of carelessness in the
laboratory. First of all, who would we appoint to act as the "science
police"? Perhaps an even better question to ask is: who would even want the
job anyway? Furthermore, it is an unconvincing argument that negligence
breeds fraud. Schmaus doesn't offer suitable evidence in support of this
claim.
Until recent years, it was assumed that science could look after these
matters by itself. Science was considered to be autonomous -- outsiders
were not to concern themselves with its affairs. Presumably, the rare
instances of scientific misconduct were dealt with fairly, judiciously, and
in a timely manner. Evidently, this is not the case. Congressional
investigations into allegations of foul play in science have become
commonplace. An "Office of Scientific Integrity" has been established
within the U.S. National Institutes of Health. Perhaps scientists are
beginning to lose portions of their autonomy?
Who are the "watchdogs of science"?
The Office of Scientific Integrity (OSI) was created in March of 1989 with
the purpose of conducting investigations of scientific misconduct. David
Hamilton reports that the OSI has
"...adopted an unusual strategy for conducting its
investigations. Instead of collecting evidence for use in a
public hearing before an administrative or criminal law judge,
the office employs an approach that director Jules Hallum calls a
"scientific dialogue," aimed at ferreting out the scientific
truth behind an allegation of misconduct. The scientific dialogue
is an ambitious attempt to keep the process of investigating
misconduct out of the hands of lawyers by keeping the focus on
the scientific issues in any given dispute.".(16)
Many scientists are critical of this tactic; the OSI investigation does not
give the accused scientists the right to confront their accusers or to
review potentially incriminating evidence gathered by the OSI. The OSI will
initially draft a report based upon their findings. The document will be
reviewed for thoroughness by the NIH director and the Office of Scientific
Integrity Review, an office within the Public Health Service. The
conclusions of the OSI will eventually come before the assistant secretary
for health, who will decide the final verdict of guilt or innocence and
choose the manner of punishment. Researchers found guilty of misconduct may
be forced to work under supervision, be suspended from NIH committees, or
be "debarred" from receiving federal grants for several years.(16)
Hamilton asks the question "If OSI fails, what will replace it?". He
suggests that "the scientific community could end up bringing upon itself a
federal investigative apparatus more similar to the "science police" than
the OSI.". The OSI directors have defended the scientific dialogue
approach. They argue that "a legalistic approach to misconduct
investigations would reduce scientists to "expert witnesses"... -- a
serious loss to the interests of science.".(16) Apparently many scientists
would like to secure the same kind of protection that they would receive in
a court of law. On the other hand, OSI deputy director Clyde Watkins
reminds that "In a legal forum, you lose the ability to distinguish
misconduct from honest error.".(16)
Technology Review has published an article with the title John Dingell:
Dark Knight of Science.(17) The headline was "While scientists cringe, one
congressman crusades to rout misconduct in U.S. research universities."
Exactly who is this Dark Knight of Science? Rep. John D. Dingell, Jr.
(D-Mich.) is chair of the House Energy and Commerce Committee as well as
its Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. Wade Roush, a doctoral
student in MIT's Program in S.T.S., reports that
"Dingell has taken on such prominent scientists as Nobel
Prize-winning biologist and Rockefeller University president
David Baltimore, Stanford president Donald Kennedy, and new
director of the National Institutes of Health, Bernadine Healy.
All three crossed Dingell in hearings conducted by his
subcommittee -- and all three are still licking their
wounds.".(17)
According to Roush,
"The issue in the clashes between Dingell and the scientific
community is not whether fraud or misconduct occurs in science --
which is, after all, a human enterprise -- but whether
scientists, universities, and funding agencies like NIH can
respond adequately when they do happen. Are allegations of
misconduct thoroughly investigated? Can scientists judge each
other without conflicts of interest? Are whistle blowers
protected from reprisals? Dingell says that he wants scientists
to police themselves. He construes their failure to do so as an
invitation to step in on behalf of the taxpayers who are footing
the research bill.".(17)
Roush suggests that Dingell will "capitalize on tips from disaffected
insiders" in order to expose wrongdoing. Dingell's following move will be
to call in the media. At the time of the hearings, Dingell applies skills
acquired from his former position as prosecutor in order to trip up
witnesses. Just as in the OSI investigations, the subcommittee hearings are
not a court of law. Therefore, due process is not officially recognized and
scientists continue to argue that they are being victimized.
Evidently, Dingell's hearings were sparked by a 1990 General Accounting
Office investigation of several institutions, which revealed that Stanford
University had used the overhead, or indirect cost, allowance accompanying
government research grants for such items as antique silverware, the
depreciation on a yacht, and operating costs of a university-owned shopping
center. He notes that MIT since has repaid the government nearly $800,000
in overhead allowances that were similarly misused. Is this not a good
thing for scientists? By having smaller portions of federal grants used for
administrative expenses, there will be a greater amount to be used by
scientists for their research.
Roush mentions that
"One root of scientist's concern about the subcommittee has been
the notion that Dingell wants the government to police science.
Dingell has repeatedly called this charge nonsense. His aim, he
says, is "seeing to it that the scientific community has the
tools, devices and mechanisms at hand to police itself, and to
see to it that the results of government-sponsored research are
of a character that can be trusted. We'd like to see the
scientists and the profession deal with that matter themselves.
They have demonstrated a considerable and continuing lack of
interest in doing that."".(17)
Walter Gilbert, a Nobel prize-winning geneticist at Harvard has agreed that
"The problem is with us. Until the profession and the universities show
that they're policing themselves, the issue isn't going to go away. [A
system of adjudication] needs to satisfy the scientists as just, and it
needs to satisfy the Congress that it's effective.".(17) It should be added
that the general public should be satisfied as well.
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* Next Chapter
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III. WHICH IS WORSE FOR SCIENCE: NEGLIGENCE OR DELIBERATE MISCONDUCT?
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Schmaus has written that there are many who believe that
"...negligent, careless, sloppy, and reckless work [are] just as
much a violation of moral duty as fraud. The potentially
disastrous effects for science and society that may accrue from
false information are the same regardless of the intentions of
the author. Erroneous data reported from the testing of new
drugs, for instance, can be dangerous whether they are a
consequence of unintentional negligence or deliberate
fraud.".(12)
These points are seemingly difficult to counter; however, let us reconsider
an instance such as the cold fusion fiasco. Even though the information
supplied by Pons and Fleischmann was found to be false due to their
negligence, how has this matter proved to be disastrous for science and
society? On the contrary, consider the easily formulated argument that
their negligence has perhaps been beneficent for science and society.
Should society be fearful of scientific fraud? Bauer indicates that "it is
extremely unlikely that an issue of fraud in science will cause much harm.
As others try to duplicate or build upon that claim, they will be unable to
do so and it will thus be exposed. The harm is to science as a profession:
time is wasted following a false trail.".(6)
In general, we can propose that both negligence and fraud are equally
harmful to science. Time is wasted by those who attempt to reproduce
experiments that do not offer a chance of success. Time is wasted by those
who must carefully scrutinize questionable results. Time is wasted by those
who must participate in outside investigations and hearings into such
matters. In each case, the time lost could have been better allocated to
potentially fruitful research activities.
Perhaps even more troubling is the damage inflicted upon the reputation of
science. Science has normally been characterized as being able to mind its
own store. Scientists proved to the public and the federal government that
their projects were not terribly risky investments by applying textbook
science to major undertakings; research initiated in the realm of the
known-unknown.(6) Fascinating results were delivered in a timely manner.
The projects had the look and feel of frontier science -- the
unknown-unknown. Spin-offs associated with big science projects were often
cited; many actually found their way quickly to the consumer. Instances of
misconduct were supposedly dealt with internally and, if not, the public
and popular media did not ordinarily have easy access to such information.
Modern technology has endowed us with an ease of information exchange. The
media, often thriving on sensationalism, has taken full advantage of these
information exchange capabilities. Approaches such as sensationalism help
to sell newspapers and magazines and keeps people sitting in front of their
televisions. Science is fair game. The general public may not have a clue
as to how a transgenic mouse is different from a regular mouse. They may
not understand the proposed chemical reactions associated with the fusion
of two deuterium atoms either, but you can be sure that they will easily
relate to a report of premeditated [scientific] dishonesty. They will have
no difficulties in understanding the implications of shared [scientific]
information that turns out to be unfounded. After all, these are violations
of the accepted rules of the game by which all persons in society are
expected to abide.
Just as society must be able to trust their policemen, firefighters, and
doctors, they must be able to trust their scientists as well. It looks very
bad for police officers everywhere when a few of their own physically
attack a motorist late at night on a California interstate highway. It
looks very bad for doctors everywhere when a doctor uses his own sperm to
impregnate as many as seventy-five women at a fertility clinic.(18)
Obviously, it looks very bad for scientists everywhere when a few of their
colleagues tell the world that something can be accomplished when it
cannot. Finally, it looks bad for all scientists when a number of their
colleagues adamantly defend forged data that they should have exhibited
skepticism toward at the outset. So, what can scientists do to mend their
professional reputations and, as a result, continue to enjoy the privilege
of self-regulation?
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* Next Chapter
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IV. DO SCIENTISTS NEED A PROFESSIONAL CODE OF ETHICS?
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Definitions
What is Professional Ethics? The American Association for the Advancement
of Science (AAAS) has offered the following definition:
"Professional Ethics refers to those principles that are intended
to define the rights and responsibilities of scientists in their
relationship with each other and with other parties including
employers, research subjects, clients, students, etc.".(19)
Webster's defines ethics as:
"1 ...the discipline dealing with what is good and bad and with
moral duty and obligation 2 a: a set of moral principles and
values b: a theory or system of moral values c: the principles of
conduct governing an individual or a group.".(20)
Incidentally, Moral is defined as:
"1 a: of or relating to principles of right and wrong in behavior
: ETHICAL b: expressing or teaching a conception of right
behavior c: conforming to a standard of right behavior ...2 pl.
a: moral practices or teachings : modes of conduct b:
ETHICS...".(20)
The AAAS Professional Ethics Project
In 1979, the AAAS initiated a professional ethics project. Early AAAS ad
hoc committees recommended that each individual society should develop
their own ethical principles and rules. William Carey provided the
disclaimer that
"It is not within the province of AAAS to set a seal of approval
or disapproval upon the approaches of its member societies toward
the problems of professional ethics. But AAAS can observe and
report progress as it occurs and provide information and
opportunities for study and debate that can clarify our future
directions.".(19)
The project was structured so that each of the affiliated scientific
societies were surveyed in order to determine if they had adopted a
professional code of ethics applicable to their members. Following the
analysis of the survey data, a workshop was held which provided a forum for
the discussion of the findings. The explicit goals of the AAAS project
were:
(1). To identify the range of professional ethics activities
conducted by the societies affiliated with AAAS;
(2). To describe ethical principles, rules of conduct, and ethics
programs adopted by the affiliated societies
(3). To suggest important areas of ethical concern which were not
addressed by the societies; and
(4). To recommend roles for the societies in the area of
professional ethics.
Results of the AAAS Project
Two-hundred and forty-one science and engineering societies affiliated with
the AAAS were surveyed. One-hundred and seventy-eight responses were
tabulated for an overall response rate of 74%. The responses of one hundred
and fifty societies were tabulated under the heading Adoption of Ethical
Rules. The table follows:
Adoption of Ethical Rules
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Yes 46 (30.7)
No 68 (45.3)
Subscribe to rules of
another society` 17a (11.3)
Members subscribe to rules
of their primary profession 19b (12.7)
NR 0
Total 150 (100)
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a Includes one society responding that its members subscribe to
the code of its parent society, but the latter society reported
that it had no code. Includes three societies that have also
adopted rules of their own.
b These are typically societies with a multidisciplinary
membership.
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This table tells us that slightly over one-half of the AAAS affiliated
respondents were governed by some sort of ethical rules in 1979. It would
be interesting to compare these results to those which would be obtained
from a present day survey. Information was recently requested via mail from
approximately twenty societies. At least six mailings were returned as
undeliverable -- forwarding order expired. It is surprising that
contemporary scientific societies are so highly mobile. Only three
professional ethical codes were received prior to the completion of this
document.
The consideration of an argument against the establishment of professional
codes of ethics
At the AAAS workshop on professional ethics, a number of commentaries were
offered with respect to the establishment of ethical codes. John Ladd of
the Department of Philosophy at Brown University provided a seminar having
the title: The Quest for a Code of Professional Ethics: An Intellectual and
Moral Confusion. He provides a summary of 11 comments which support his
argument that "... the whole notion of an organized professional ethics is
an absurdity -- intellectual and moral.".(19) I would like to address a
number of these comments and, in doing so, convince the reader that
although his arguments are sound, they are not entirely convincing.
First, Ladd argues that "Ethics consists of issues to be examined,
explored, discussed, deliberated, and argued. Ethical principles can be
established only as a result of deliberation and argumentation. These
principles are not the kind of thing that can be settled by fiat, by
agreement or by authority.". These observations are agreeable. It should be
noted, however, that they are posed in a very one-sided manner. An easy
misinterpretation of these statements is that "Scholars in the practice of
philosophy have examined, explored, discussed, deliberated, and argued
about ethics for a very long time. Philosophers have never reached a
consensus regarding ethics; therefore, we cannot expect mere people of
science to have any success either. Besides, if ethics were a black/white,
true/false, or right/wrong issue, then many philosophers would be out of
work.". The best interpretation of Ladd's argument is that scientists have
already gotten off to a poor start in their quest for a professional code.
He suggests that professional code of ethics is a misnomer. What scientists
really mean to say -- what they really want -- is a professional code of
conduct. Agreed! It will never be possible for a group to completely agree
upon an acceptable code of professional ethics. However, it is not
unreasonable to assume that a group can reach a consensus regarding an
acceptable code of professional conduct.
Ladd's next argument is that "... ethics must, by its very nature, be
self-directed rather than other-directed.". Certainly! In very few
instances is it proper for someone to try to impose their values (ethics)
upon a researcher; however, it would indeed be acceptable for someone to
impose a code of conduct. This makes all the difference. At this point, one
must then choose to either play by the conventionally accepted rules or not
participate at all. Scientists, as well as philosophers, should be offended
at the thought that there are others would have the temerity to try to
impose their personal ethical values.
Ladd advises that ethical rules are automatically converted to legal rules,
or some other type of authoritative rules of conduct, when disciplinary
procedures are attached to them. That is exactly the point of this
discussion. What we really mean to call a code of conduct, we have
erroneously presented as a code of ethics. A code of conduct should
explicitly discuss disciplinary procedures. All participants should know
what the potential punishments are before they agree to abide by the
accepted code. Thus, in reply to the title of this paper, the answer is
simple. Science does not need a professional code of ethics. Instead, it
actually needs a professional code of conduct.
A valid point made by Ladd is that "Professionals are not, simply because
they are professionals, exempt from the common obligations, duties and
responsibilities that are binding on ordinary people.". General moral norms
specify that scientists must play by the same fundamental rules that apply
to society-at-large. Ladd follows with a discussion of macro- and
micro-ethics. Regarding micro-ethical issues, he argues that it shouldn't
be necessary to remind professionals that they ought to refrain from
cheating and lying, mistreatment of their clients, and so on. Not true!
Professionals typically have a certain power-advantage over others that
must be moderated and restrained. People of such authority should be
frequently reminded of their professional code(s) of conduct.
Ladd eventually issues the statement that "Any association, including a
professional association, can, of course, adopt a code of conduct for its
members and lay down disciplinary procedures and sanctions to enforce
conformity with its rules.". He reminds us that such "codes are often
directed at other addressees than members [of the profession]. The real
addressees might be any of the following: (a) members of the profession,
(b) clients or buyers of the professional services, (c) other agents
dealing with professionals, such as government or private institutions like
universities or hospitals, or (d) the public at large.".
Ladd continues by addressing some possible primary objectives. He notes
that "...for those to whom it [the code of conduct] is addressed and who
need it the most will not adhere to it anyway, and the rest of the good
people in the profession will not need it because they already know what
they ought to do.". At least those who violate the code of conduct, by
which they have knowingly agreed to abide, will have no difficulty in
realizing the exact point at which they have dishonored both themselves and
their profession. He argues that "code [of conduct] is hardly the best
means for teaching morality.". The code should not be used as a teaching
tool in the first place; it should merely be a friendly reminder of how
professionals are expected to conduct themselves. Another argument given by
Ladd is that "a code cannot offer advice in cases of moral perplexities
about what to do.". Agreed. We can say, however, that a code can help to
differentiate perplexing instances that necessitate concern, or even
action, from those which a professional might otherwise shrug off as being
business as usual.
Regarding an important secondary objective, Ladd notes that a code of
conduct might be used to enhance the image of the profession in the public
eye -- that the code would communicate to the general public the idea that
the members of the profession are concerned about what is right or wrong.
Is this not a good thing? Would the general public prefer that their
professionals not strive to follow guidelines that help to distinguish
proper conduct from improper conduct or right from wrong? Certainly not!
The remainder of Ladd's commentary is couched in a similar manner, with the
exception of this useful piece of advice at the very end of his
presentation: "[associations] can fill a very educational function by
encouraging their members to participate in extended discussions of issues
of both micro-ethics and macro-ethics, e.g. questions about responsibility;
for these issues obviously need to be examined and discussed much more
extensively than they are at present -- especially by those who are in a
position to do something about them.".(19)
Should Formal Ethics Training be Implemented?
A 1991 article in The Scientist is titled "Institutions Hustle to Meet NIH
Ethics Training Mandate".(21) Rather than trying to impose ethics upon
students, wouldn't it be more worthwhile to remind them occasionally of the
professional code of conduct that they have agreed to abide by in order to
participate in the discipline of science? Rather than requiring formalized
coursework, shouldn't they simply be reminded of the codes that they have
conventionally agreed upon as constituting proper conduct? Shouldn't they
be advised that they should always strive to meet the ideals expressed in
the scientific method and the Mertonian norms -- even though they are only
ideals after all? Shouldn't they be reminded that it is acceptable for
scientists, just like anyone else, to make mistakes, but that it is
entirely unacceptable to be deliberately dishonest? Shouldn't they be
reminded of the dishonor and debarment that eventually befalls malicious
offenders? There are plenty of contemporary examples. Should they not be
reminded that scientists should strive to be more careful in their work,
and more skeptical of their findings, than those in many other professions?
It has been suggested that students of science were in the past made aware
of the rights and responsibilities of their profession (or unwritten codes
of conduct) while participating in their graduate training. Evidently,
students received the proper ideas about what constitutes proper
professional conduct during the rites of passage that eventually led them
to the Ph.D. degree. Pundits are now concerned that graduate students are
not being properly trained in these matters by their mentors, professors,
and colleagues. We must also consider that undergraduate students will even
have a much lesser chance of becoming initiated during their finite
journeys to the B.S. degree. The university or college environment should
be an optimum setting for occasional seminars and discussions regarding
professional conduct. The corporate environment might be a more challenging
arena, but most concerned corporations have already instituted professional
codes of conduct for their employees anyway. Many corporations provide
mandatory training and development courses that serve to remind their
employees about company policies such as sexual harassment, employee
tobacco use, grievance procedures, and so on. As an extension of these
activities, it would merely be a matter of scheduling by their training and
development departments in order to hold seminars and discussions
concerning proper professional conduct from time to time.
Colwyn Trevarthen, of the Psychology Department at the University of
Edinburgh, has provided a commentary for the foreword of the text Science
and Moral Priority, by Roger Sperry, Trevarthen offers the following:
"Because he seeks a particular truth in objective experience, the
scientist rarely makes a contribution to the philosophy of
morals. He hoes the fields of knowledge without looking far into
the landscape or deep within himself. Trying to keep his mind on
the facts and task at hand, he resists involvement in loose
speculation or passionate argument. The successful scientist must
have disciplined thought and be dedicated to unbiased
investigation agreeing always to conditions which can be
identified and measured in terms that are universally acceptable.
The nature of creative inquiry draws his mental focus into such a
narrow channel that he may tend in time to know much less than
his neighbors about human affairs, about beliefs and perspectives
regarding life as a whole, and especially about the irrational
sources of interpersonal life.".(22)
Although his statement is somewhat stereotypical, Trevarthen has listed a
number of valid points. Professional codes of conduct will serve to
reassure the public and the federal government that scientists aren't as
narrow-minded as they might seem. It will show that all scientists are
concerned with the issue of proper conduct; that they are concerned about
human affairs, beliefs and perspectives just as their neighbors are. It
will show that scientists know what constitutes misconduct within their
profession and that they have a plan of action to follow when instances of
misconduct arise.
The AAAS project has confirmed these observations by offering the following
statement:
"The formulation of ethical principles or the adoption of rules
of conduct by a professional society can be viewed as a
significant indicator of the profession's willingness to accept
some responsibility for defining proper professional conduct,
sensitizing members to important ethical issues embodied in these
standards, and governing member behavior. But the presence of a
set of ethical principles or rules of conduct is only part,
albeit an important one, of the machinery needed to effect
self-regulation. The impact of a profession's ethical principles
or rules on its members' behavior may be negligible, however,
without appropriate support activities to encourage proper
professional conduct, or the means to detect and investigate
possible violations, and to impose sanctions on violators.
Provisions for actively implementing and enforcing a profession's
rules of conduct does not guarantee effective self-regulation;
but their presence does make it possible.".(19)
Conclusion
In conclusion, scientists need well-defined and clearly written
professional codes of conduct. Additionally, well-defined procedures for
handling accusations of misconduct should be developed, agreed upon, and
implemented. Those accused of misconduct should be afforded, at minimum,
the same rights that are given to those who participate in the conventional
legal system. At the beginning of their professional training, scientists
should know the nature of their punishment should they fail to abide by
their code of conduct. They should be frequently reminded of their
professional obligations; whether by seminars, informal discussion groups,
formal initiation into appropriate professional societies, or other means.
Ladd has suggested that certificates might even be provided to
professionals for prominent display in their laboratories, offices, and
such.(19) Why not? I recall an engineer's toolbox years ago that boasted
the statement "I will never provide any piece of work that I would not
gladly sign my name to." -- a simple and elegant code of conduct. Is it not
reassuring?
Bauer has stated that "Professions that do not keep themselves ethical and
credible lose their autonomy.".(6) Science cannot afford to lose its
autonomy and self-regulation. It's time for science professionals to prove
that they are concerned. Professional codes of conduct cannot serve as a
panacea, but they will provide scientists with a firm foundation upon which
to build.
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* Return to Misconduct in Science
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Literature Cited
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1). W. Broad and N. Wade. Betrayers of the truth. New York, NY: Simon and
Schuster, 1982.
(2). A. Kohn. False Prophets. New York, NY: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1986.
(3). F. Close. Too Hot To Handle. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1991.
(4). R. Dagani. Utah cold fusion institute research deemed sound. Chemical
& Engineering News. December 24, 1990. p. 5.
(5). B.J. Culliton and E. Rubinstein. Inside the Gallo Probe. Science. June
22, 1990. Vol. 248, p. 1494.
(6). H.H. Bauer. Scientific Literacy and the Myth of the Scientific Method.
VPI&SU: Department of Science & Technology Studies, Blacksburg, VA 24061.
(7). R. Dagani. Cold fusion takes a licking, but keeps on ticking. Chemical
& Engineering News. April 6, 1992. p. 6.
(8). D. Charles. Last act of American science 'soap opera'. New Scientist.
March 30, 1991. p. 8.
(9). D. Baltimore. Self-Regulation of Science. Technology Review.
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(10). D. Charles. Last act of American science 'soap opera'. New Scientist.
March 30, 1991. p. 8.
(11). D.P. Hamilton. Baltimore Throws in the Towel. Science. May 10, 1991.
Vol. 252, p. 768.
(12). W. Schmaus. Fraud and the Norms of Science. Science, Technology, &
Human Values. Fall, 1983. Vol. 8, #4, p. 12.
(13). T.L. Brown and H.E. LeMay, Jr. Chemistry: The Central Science. 2nd
Ed. NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1981.
(14). J. Ziman. An introduction to science studies. Cambridge, GB:
Cambridge University Press. 1984.
(15). R.H. Brown. The Wisdom of Science. Cambridge, GB: Cambridge
University Press. 1986.
(16). D.P. Hamilton. Can OSI Withstand a Scientific Backlash? Science.
Sept. 6 1991. Vol. 253, p. 1084.
(17). W. Roush. John Dingell: Dark Knight of Science. Technology Review.
January 1992. p. 58.
(18). Cutting out the middle man: fertility fraud. The Economist. January
4, 1992. p. A27.
(19). R. Chalk, M.S. Frankel, and S.B. Chafer. AAAS Professional Ethics
Project. American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1515
Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20005. AAAS Publication 80-R-4.
1980.
(20). Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary. Springfield, Mass.: G. & C.
Merriam Company. 1975.
(21). R. Eisner. Institutions Hustle to Meet NIH Ethics Training Mandate.
The Scientist. October 28, 1991.
(22). R. Sperry. Science and Moral Priority: Merging Mind, Brain, and Human
Values. New York: Coumbia University Press. 1983.
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